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the court reflected an evolving temperament of increased judicial
scrutiny of discretionary administrative standards:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years
courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference ...
Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power to set aside
agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor had entered into the
decision, or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, the
power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that
administrators articulate the factors on which they base their decisions. "
Failure to appreciate this principle certainly contributed to the second
Nor-Am decision. The facts were undisputed in Nor-Am that there
was no evidence indicating that the products whose registration had
been suspended were involved in any incidents or that the products
had caused adverse effects in more than twenty years of use.
Furthermore, a fair inference could be drawn that the one incident had
been the sole motivating factor behind the suspension order and had
been the result of negligence on the part of the injured persons.'
Nothing in the FIFRA compels the conclusion that a suspension
order issued without factual justification should be immune from
threshold judicial review. For this reason, the second Nor-Am
decision holding that the emergency suspension order was not a final
order and therefore not reviewable appears erroneous.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Jewel Companies, Inc. v. FTC' the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a district court has jurisdiction, prior to the
completion of FTC proceedings and notwithstanding the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to determine whether a
commissioner in voting for the issuance of a complaint had
improperly interpreted his statutory obligation. The FTC brought
154. - F.2d at - Compare FTC v. Crowther, 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970), discussed at
DEcisIONS section supra. For further indication from the same court of the increasing emphasis
on collaboration between court and agency, see Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
F.2d , - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
155. The precise holding of the three-judge panel, reversed on rehearing, was stated as
follows: "[W]e do not here purport to balance the conflicting interests of the public. Rather we
hold that, at the present juncture, the finding of the district court that the suspension of the
registration was arbitrary and capricious is adequately supported on the record." 435 F.2d at
1145.
156. 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970).
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charges against retail buyers and "field brokers" alleging that the
retail buyers directly or indirectly controlled the field brokers, who
also were agents of produce sellers, thereby violating section 2(c) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. 57 One of the three commissioners who
voted for issuance of the complaint filed a separate statement
indicating that he thought issuance was mandatory, rather than
discretionary, when the Commission had "reason to believe" that the
Robinson-Patman Act was violated.1s The buyers and brokers sought
to enjoin administrative proceedings pursuant to his complaint,
alleging that the commissioner's separate opinion indicated that he
misunderstood his statutory authority.'59 Three other grounds for
relief were alleged but were summarily dismissed by the court: that the
complaint did not state a cause of action under the Robinson-Patman
Act; that the Commission did not find the issuance to be in the public
interest; and that the Secretary of Agriculture had exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' The district court, in denying
the Commission's motion to dismiss, issued a temporary restraining
order and certified the question to the appellate court."' The Seventh
Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction to make the
determination.162
In order to conserve judicial resources, judicial review of
administrative actions, including final orders, is generally limited in
scope. 6 ' This policy is primarily implemented by two judicial
inquiries, both of which reflect the desire to preserve the separation of
the executive and judicial branches of government and the autonomy
of independent agencies. 6 4 First, is there provision for statutory
review? If so, Congress is deemed to have chosen the method of
157. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
158. Whenever the Commission or Board vested with jurisdiction thereof shall have
reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions of
§§ 13, 14, 18 and 19, of this title, it shall issue and serve upon such person and the
Attorney General a complaint stating its charges in that respect. . . . Id. § 21(b).
159. Food Fair Stores, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,850, at
21,177 (FTC 1969).
160. The exclusive jurisdiction allegedly was to be found under 7 U.S.C. § 499(a) et seq.
(1964).
161. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Myers, 15 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1936), affd, 88
F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1937), affd, 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
162. Cf Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
163. See Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 327
(1962).
164. Id. at 328.
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protecting the rights it has created and to have selected the precise
machinery suited to achieve that end.6 5 If not, the Supreme Court has
held in a number of cases, the most notable of which is Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Board,166 that a district court has no
power to review the action of an administrative agency. 6 7 In
Switchmen the Court held that the district court was powerless to
review the issuance of a collective bargaining certificate by the Board,
reasoning that it would not furnish a method for judicial review if one
were not provided by Congress, even where questions of law might
have been involved.' The second judicial inquiry is: Has the plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies? In Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp. 6' suit was initiated to enjoin the NLRB from
holding hearings on a complaint filed by the Board alleging that the
corporate defendant had engaged in unfair labor practices interfering
with interstate commerce. The district court issued the requested
injunction, reasoning that the specified portions of the NLRAI7 ° did
not apply to the defendant since the corporation was not involved in
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
district court was not empowered to enjoin the NLRB hearings, since
substituting the court for the NLRB as the hearing tribunal would be
"at war with the long settled rule of judicial administration" that no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed ihjury until the
prescribed administrative process has been exhausted.' Subsequent
cases have held that judicial review inures only when the decision is
unwarranted in light of the record and lacking a reasonable basis in
law. 172
165. See Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943). Of
course, the provision may be in a statute other than the act establishing the agency under
consideration. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act frequently is a source of
jurisdiction for review.
166. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
167. See Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 633 (1913); accord, Ruby v. American
Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944); Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1924).
168. 320 U.S. at 303. See also Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479
(1919); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1903).
169. 303 U.S.41 (1937).
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6)(7), 158(l)(2) (1964).
171. 303 U.S. at 50-51. Myers has been criticized for denying district courts their injunctive
powers. One commentator argues that the reasoning in Myers is circular and that the Court
wrongly used "the exclusive power of the NLRB and the Court of Appeals over unfair labor
practices as a reason for holding that a district court has no power over action of the Board in
excess of its jurisdiction." 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 59 (1958).
172. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1943); cf. Lone Star Cement Corp.
v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Several exceptions to the Myers exhaustion doctrine have arisen.17
In Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States 74 a corporation sued to
enjoin the ICC from authorizing a rate increase, basing its claim on
the language of the Interstate Commerce Act which declared that no
rate increase was to be permitted unless, after a hearing, the ICC
found that the increase rested on changed conditions other than the
elimination of competition. 75 The corporation alleged that because
the prescribed statutory hearing had not been held prior to a
Commission-approved increase in rates, the ICC had exceeded its
statutory p6wers and the rate increase was void. The Supreme Court
pointed out that the corporation would have to proceed first through
administrative channels if it were contesting the reasonablenss of the
increase. However, the Court reasoned that the corporation was not
contesting unreasonable or discriminatory rates or an error in ICC
action but rather was questioning the power of the Commission to
act. Consequently, the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the
enforcement of the order, even if the plaintiff had not attempted to
secure redress in a proceeding bdfore the Commission. 176 This same
reasoning underlies the Leedom v. Kyne 77 decision, wherein the
NLRB determined that a particular bargaining unit was to include
both professional and nonprofessional employees, although section
9(b)(i) of the NLRA clearly stated that the professional employees
were not to be included unless a majority specifically voted for such
inclusion. 17 In answering a suit seeking to vacate the NLRB
determination as allegedly made in excess of its statutory powers, the
Board argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the suit. The Supreme Court held that the suit was not one seeking
'" 'review', in the sense of that term as used in the Act, [of] an order or
decision made within its jurisdiction,"' 1 but rather was instigated to
strike down an order made in excess of the Board's enumerated
173. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (on foreign policy grounds);
Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943) (on grounds of invasion of
federal jurisdiction by stite agency); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(on due process grounds).
174. 249 U.S. 557 (1919).
175. Ch. 309, § 8, 36 Stat. 547-48 [now 49 U.S.C. § 4(2) (1964)].
176. 249 U.S. at 562-63.
177. 358 U.S. 184 (1958); accord, Farmer v. UEW, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954). Contra, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 927 (9th Cir.
1946).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1964).
179. 358 U.S. at 188.
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powers. Further, the absence of review would have caused the loss of a
legislatively bestowed right, since there was no other appropriate
remedy to protect that right. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional's°
judicial review of a NLRB determination prior to exhaustion of
administrative remedies was upheld on the basis that the NLRB had
no jurisdiction to determine a union representation question
concerning foreign seamen aboard foreign-flag vessels. However, the
Supreme Court stated that this decision was not to be regarded as an
enlargement of the Kyne exception but rather was necessitated by
complex questions of foreign relations. 8' In Boire v. Greyhound
Corp. 8 2 this exception to the exhaustion doctrine was further limited.
The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that, since an independent
contractor is not an employee under the NLRA,'8 a Board finding
that Greyhound was the employer of an independent contractor's
employees was in excess of its statutory power. The Court reasoned
that the question of Greyhound's status was factual, was not a
determination solely dependent on statutory construction, and was
therefore to be determined according to the administrative procedures
set forth in the governing statute. The exception to the Myers rule,
represented by the Skinner & Eddy and Kyne cases, is therefore clearly
a narrow one, and the cases indicate that review is permissible only for
a purely legal question, rather than a mixed question of law and fact.
In Jewel Companies, Inc. v. FTC the Seventh Circuit considered
that the question of whether a commissioner misinterpreted the
Robinson-Patman Act as calling for mandatory issuance of a
complaint when there is "reason to believe" that the Act has been
violated was purely a statutory question and reviewable by a district
court. Upon reviewing the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and exceptions thereto, the court reasoned that the relevant
inquiry necessary to determine if such review is permissible is whether
the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy in the appellate court
after agency action. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that on final appeal
the standard of review would be different from the standard for testing
the authority of the commissioner, for on review of a final order the
appellate court only assesses the factual determinations made by the
agency, to decide only whether the final order is supported by
180. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
181. Id. at 17.
182. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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substantial evidence.1s4 The Commission's underlying authority to
issue the complaint would not be questioned, the court reasoned, and
therefore the review of a final order would be an inadequate remedy.
The court concluded that granting review before the completion of
administrative proceedings could be a dangerous precedent if it
encouraged delaying tactics by wealthy parties. However, it
recognized that under certain circumstances where there is a need for
flexibility in judicial procedures,8 5 review should be granted.
Although not opposed to judicial review prior to exhaustion of
administrative remedies per se, the dissenting judge asserted that
inquiry into the reasoning process of a commissioner who votes as a
member of a body is wholly improper in itself.8 6 To support this
contention he distinguished Wilson v. United States'87 where such an
inquiry was made but the reviewing body consisted of one officer and
not a group of individuals. Furthermore, the dissenter felt that the
legal issue in Jewel was of too little significance to justify dissecting
and re-examining the votes, especially since there was nothing in the
Commissioner's concurring opinion to indicate that he would have
voted differently if he had correctly interpreted the law.
The exception to the exhaustion doctrine applied in Jewel is a
reasonable one. Where there is merely a question of statutory
interpretation there is no need to wait for the application of the
expertise of administrative bodies since no factual determinations are
to be made. The only question before the district court is whether the
agency has power to act under the circumstances of the particular
case. The court mentioned that if review is permitted only after agency
action, Jewel could have no adequate remedy since the appellate court
"would not question the authority of the Commission in issuing the
complaint."' 8 There is no reason why an appellate court cannot
inquire into the power of the Commission to determine if the agency
acted outside the scope of its delegated powers,'89 but such a procedure
would amount to a waste of agency time and plaintiff's money, since
the agency would be making a complete investigation of the
complaint when it may have no power to do so- a situation that
could have been avoided by the procedure sanctioned by Jewel.
184. 432 F.2d at 1159.
185. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 432-37 (1965).
186. 432 F.2d at 1161-62; cf United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
187. 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
.188. 432 F.2d at 1159.
189. 249 U.S. at 562.
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However, this procedure could be abused; excessive court review prior
to administrative hearings would destroy the agency's role as an
autonomous executive or regulatory body. But the possibility of some
review prior to agency action, particularly where prescribed statutory
procedures have been disregarded, should serve to remind agencies of
the limitations on their powers without impairing their effectiveness.
Generally speaking this exception, if not abused, is beneficial. But
should this exception have been applied under the circumstances of the
Jewel case where the only evidence that tended to show that the agency
had acted outside of its statutory authority was the concurring
opinion of one Commissioner? The chief argument against review
under these circumstances is that it would tend to discourage the
writing of separate opinions and would thereby deprive the legal
community of novel theories that may be the majority opinion in
future cases. However, the likelihood of this happening seems remote
since an erroneous concurring opinion will be considered harmless
error unless the concurring commissioner is the "swing man"-his
vote being decisive for the determination of the particular issue. This
was arguably the case in Jewel, for had the concurring Commissioner
applied the appropriate law the complaint might not have issued.
Thus, the pressure against writing separate opinions seems not to be
very great. The advantage of the procedure sanctioned by Jewel is the
saving of agency time, since the complex factual determinations that
must be made in Robinson-Patman actions would be avoided if the
court later finds the agency powerless to issue a complaint. Of course
the time of the district court might needlessly be expended if it is
found that the Commission does have power to issue the complaint,
negating one of the purposes for which administrative tribunals were
created. However, it seems clear that in taking into account the
agency savings there would be a net conservation of time and
elimination of unnecessary delay if the Jewel procedure is followed. In
summary, the exception applied by the Jewel court is a desirable one,
if not abused, and its application in the instant case was correct for
the Commissioner's vote was crucial to the ultimate determination of
plaintiff's rights. No sufficient policy consideration outweighs the
objective of providing plaintiffs with adequate remedies without
unnecessary delay and expense.
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